The Large Technical System approach was introduced by the influential historian of technology, Thomas P. Hughes, in the 1970's and is one of the most prominent theoretical frameworks within the Science and Technology Studies. However, it has found little attention in relation to the digital realm. This research applies the LTS framework onto the US-American company Google and seeks to bring a conceptual understanding to the company's exponential growth. Thus, it describes the emergence and evolution of Google as a complex system -an alignment of components of technical and non-technical nature -and assigns patterns and concepts to its development. This research provides an answer to how Google not only gained a system structure but also reached the notion of momentum. Yet, suggesting a social constructivist path, this paper secludes by elucidating the influencing power of the LTS's user -an important factor which was widely disregarded in the initial works of Hughes.
1.
The Dynamics of Google within the Frame of a Large Technical System Thomas Edison invented the light bulb, founded the Edison General Electric Company and brought light to American cities and villages (Hughes, 1993) . Henry Ford launched the Quadricycle, established the Ford Motor Company, and brought the car to American streets (Hughes, 2000) . Larry Page and Sergey Brin brought to life a search algorithm, started Google Inc. and changed information gathering on a global scale. (Vise & Malseed, 2006) . In modern society, only a few companies had and have a ubiquitous influence on people's life, culture and politics. In most cases, they stared out with small, unique ideas and, within a couple of years, developed into systems and networks of great structural complexity. (Joerges, 1996) Google, even more than General Electric and Ford, is one of the leading examples of companies which rose from a simple idea into a multi-billion-dollar business-network. It took Edison more than half a century to electrify American homes (Hughes, 1993) . In only a fragment thereof -9 years -Google reached 70 percent of all internet users, billions of people across the world. (Auletta, 2010) . Although this comparison lacks considering the difference between the physical and the digital realm, it encapsulates the enormous scale of growth. With a fourth term revenue of $39,2 billion Dollar in 2018 (De Vynck, 2019) it is almost unimaginable that the history of Google started in a garage only two decades ago. But how did the company arrive at such a point of complexity, no longer existing as a pure search engine, but as a company that has branches in sectors ranging from biology to robotics? (Schulz, 2017) Being such a young company, not much academic research has been done on Google's emergence and growth. By approaching its business model (Schmidt, 2014; Holden, 2008; Lowe, 2009) or the structure of algorithm (Baskin, Brashars & Long 2007; Burns & Sauers, 2014; Guermeur & Unruh, 2010) most publications deal with narrow aspects of Google's characteristics. The history of Google and especially 1 Julian Schäfer received a bachelor degree in Arts and Culture at Maastricht University in 2019. At the moment he takes a Master in Governance of Technology and Innovation at RWTH Aachen University. Contact: julianjschaefer@web.de lee It is quite evident that the current state of Google does possess a system structure and structuring capacity as described by Hughes. In 2015, Google was divided into the company's traditional and new branches. "Google search"," YouTube", "Google Maps", inter alia, are now separated from new projects such as "Google X" and "Google Ventures" which conduct research in the field of autonomous cars and microbiology. All companies are united under the umbrella company called "Alphabet" (Schulz, 2017) . No other company seems to have such an omnipresent role in everyday life. Google is no longer the simple search engine it was originally intended to be. It has become part of everyday life, culture and language.
"The internet made information available. Google made information accessible" (Schulz, 2017 p.35) . In this context, it is of greater interest to take a step back and investigate how such a structure of power came into existence and what it may imply.
This study entails applying an LTS approach to Google. The research investigates if phases and concepts as described by Hughes can be identified in Google's history. I am interested in finding out to what extent the theoretical concept of Large Technical Systems (LTS) can provide fruitful insights into the complexity and success of this internet platform? In doing so, I will analyze if the company became part of what Hughes calls a "deep structure", i.e. a structure that has surpassed key drivers of social change such as politics and geography. No previous LTS research considered an internet platform as the object of study. The majority of previous LTS studies conducted research with individual companies in individual countries. (Kaijser & Vleuten, 2006) I do not intend to cover the entire history of Google. For the analysis, I will spotlight the company's early period (1997 -2005) , with special attention to the year 2002. In this
year, Google first became financially profitable due to the introduction of personalized advertising. I will furthermore focus on the major events in the company's history and restrict myself to the general LTS definition by Hughes. The information about Google's development are predominantly taken from the books "The Google story" (Vise & Malseed, 2006) ; "Googled: The end of the world as we know it" (Auletta, 2010) , "Was Google wirklich will. Wie der einflussreichste Konzern der Welt unsere Zukunft verändert"
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Combined, these sources provided me comprehensive insights into its chronological emergence. Further definitions of subsequent LTS research that focus on narrow aspects of the system will only be regarded to a limited extent. In the first step of my research, I will elucidate the Large Technical System approach and apply it to the corporate history of Google. Furthermore, I will discuss the framework under consideration of a previously widely disregarded actor, namely the user. Overall, this research conceptualizes the development of Google for the first time within the realm of STS. In doing so, I intend to pave the way for further discussion and research in the field of LTS studies in relation to modern internet companies.
Large Technical Systems -A Versatile Interpretable Approach
Large Technical Systems are complex and so is their definition. It is immensely difficult to use a generally accepted definition for LTS research. Unlike, for instance, the social construction of technology (SCOT) by Pinch and Bijker, the LTS approach does not supply a sharply defined methodology (Bijker, Hughes, Pinch, 2012) . Rather, it should be interpreted as an open research approach with different concepts and research strategies (Vleuten & Kaijser 2006) . Researchers applying the Large Technical System approach use definitions inspired by the work of Hughes but substitute them to fit their specific needs and purposes.
Therefore, even the meaning of the basic terms "large", "technical" and "system" can vary strongly depending on their discipline. One attempt is to define a Large Technical System by its function suggesting to "determine the relative quantity (complexity, speed, rate of growth, etc.) of activities materialized in such systems and the quantity of other social processes necessitated in order to function" (Mayntz & Hughes, 2005 p.24 ).
Other definitions depend on the relative largeness of the system per se. Particularly, Bernward
Joerges defines Large Technical systems as:
[…] complex and heterogeneous systems of physical structures and complex machineries which (1) are materially integrated, or "coupled" over large spans of time, quite irrespective of their particular cultural, political, economic and corporate makeup, and (2) support or sustain the function of very large numbers of other technical systems, whose organizations they thereby link. (Mayntz & Hughes, 2005 p.24) Although such definitions contribute to a basic understanding of the subject, they are of little use for an extensive discussion of LTSs in relation to Google. To simply apply these definitions to internet service provider would undercut its broader dynamics, such as the implications for society at large.
Additionally, the realm of my case study would turn out to be problematic to apply in this context since Google's evolution takes place in the digital and physical sphere. Such factors were previously disregarded.
Unfortunately, Hughes, who died during the during the rise of the most popular internet services in 2005 (Ryan, 2013) , did not explicitly apply his LTS approach on digital service providers. Yet, his methodological angle is most applicable for my approach. Instead of providing a sharp, five-line working definition he analyzed the dynamics from a descriptive stance and organized the system in different concepts. In the following, I will illustrate Hughes' basic concepts of LTSs. Simultaneously, I will here relate to the development of Google and point out corresponding patterns.
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Structure
Before diving into the analysis of Google, I need to evaluate Hughes' fundamental framework of LTSs in more depth. The fundamental structure of an LTS consists of a network of interrelated components -the system. The system is of national, but mostly global scale (Gökalp, 1992) . Noticeably, components have different functions and can be of very different nature (Bijker, Hughes, Pinch, 2012) . Thus, Hughes distinguished between physical artifacts -material technology components -such as machines and production devices, organizational structures which control and govern the system, as well as institutional elements which provide a regulatory framework, the system's cultural values and professional know-how.
Together the components build up a material and immaterial as well as human entity with closely interrelated parts and processes. Hughes stresses that a clear classification and restriction of components must be provided. If one component is investigated in isolation, a system structure with further components and organizational arrangements might appear again. In other words, components can consist of individual sub-systems and are categorized in accordance with the system. All components are united by a common objective -the system goal. They all contribute to a larger outcome or product.
At this point, scholars of STS might point out similarities to the "Actor-Network" approach by
Michel Callon and Bruno Latour in which components -or according to Callon and Latour, "actors" -can be of technical and physical nature, too (Muniesa, 2015) . To a certain extent, this is correct, but while the "Actor-Network" approach treats actors of the network with relative equality, the LTS approach argues for a guiding force which steers the LTS. According to Hughes, such forces are executed by managers, inventors, engineers called system builders (SB). The SB aligns the technical and non-technical components into a socio-technical whole. In other words, the SB oversees the hardware invention and development as well as the organizational structure of the Large Technical System and enforces centralization within. The character of the SB varies in accordance to the systems development. Hence, Hughes distinguishes between the inventor-entrepreneur, the manager-entrepreneur and the financeentrepreneur. Even though the System Builder seems to be a dominant figure, the system and the SB are strongly dependent on each other. While the SB is reliant on the system's function and the system is reliant on the SB's strategy. In my later analysis, I will look as the concept of the system builder more closely.
Taking a step back, the Large Technical System is placed in an environment -a physical but also non-physical setting such as the market -which cannot be controlled by the system builder. However, it is the goal of the system and its builder to gain control over some of the environmental factors by incorporating them into the system. For instance, this can be achieved through the domination of the market. By means of control, factors of uncertainty such as a once free market are eradicated. The LTS becomes more calculable and more influential in this environment. Later Hughes describes this phenomenon as the momentum, a concept which will be relevant in the last part of the paper.
Emergence and Development
Having explained the foundation of the system, I can turn to the LTS's emergence and development.
Hughes suggests that the development of a large technical system is neither linear nor stable at any time (Bijker, Hughes, Pinch, 2012) . It undergoes a constant process of change. New Large Technical Systems can supersede others or merge. They can spread from national to international territorial or change radically in competition with others. However, changes of an LTS can be framed into four major phases:
invention phases, development phase, innovation phase and competition and consultation.
While going thought these phases, the system's number of interrelated components increases, and consequently, does its complexity. The expansion, however, comes with some cost and hence sooner or later the LTS will inevitably encounter problems which hinder its further growth. Hughes calls these problems reverse salients and they are characterized by underdeveloped components, organizational anomalies or general uneven development. To illustrate, a technical system's growth might be impeded by environmental factors, restricting policies or by a system's component becoming overwhelmed by its current task. It is the duty of the system builder to identify reverse salients, characterize them as critical problems and enact countermeasures. Put simply, the system builder is the "problem-solving manager" who steers the direction of an LTS. Like the system's components, the reverse salient can be of technical and non-technical character. Therefore, the system builder often engages in transdisciplinary problemsolving.
Invention Phase
A new Large Technical System originates in the invention phase. According to Hughes, all sociotechnical systems start out with and are structured around a technical core, the so called radical new invention. for the invention process. The professional inventor entrepreneur, on the contrary, works for a Large Technical System. He has access to a variety of resources, however, lacks creative freedom because the creation of new inventions, which are incompatible with the existing LTS structure, are not favored by the system. In effect, radical new inventions do not occur on a regular basis. They are extremely rare because of their demand for innovative freedom and resources. (Bijker, Hughes, Pinch, 2012) For the analysis of the innovation phase of Google, the environment in which the company took shape needs to be considered. Unlike the Ford Motor Company or General Electrics, Google is not a producer of physical goods in a physical environment, but a service provider in a digital realm. For this reason, my LTS analysis has conceptualized the internet per se as environment. In a different analytical frame, the internet as such can be considered a Large Technical System itself, yet since it provides the stage for Google's and other relevant companies' rises, I regard this reduction as justified.
In the early 90's, the internet differed heavily from how we know it today. People were just beginning to write e-mails or create websites. (Vise & Malseed, 2006) . Bit by bit actors of every kind became aware that almost silently a new marketplace was on the rise: The World Wide Web. Yet, despite all its new advantages, one fundamental problem soon emerged. Although it suddenly became possible to 6 Marble Research Papers create information and share with everyone in the world, the more the internet was used, the more difficult it became to find what one was looking for. Efficient web-searching was not born yet.
Google's innovation phase started due to the two system builders named Larry Page and Sergey Brin.
Page and Brin were both PhD students at Stanford University and had a common interest in the emerging fields of data science and data mining. They were interested in improving internet searching. Web-searchprograms at the time were almost useless. With the exponential growth of the web, search engines as for example offered by Netscape, which was the most popular web browser of the early World Wide Web, The solution which would bring order to chaos was proposed by Page and Brin in the form of a radical new invention called "Page Rank". "Page Pank" was an algorithm which not only came up with the correct search results but also seemed to sort them according to their relevance (Wiesend, 2015) . But, how did it work? Until today, the precise function of Google's backbone remains secret. However, to understand Google's radical new invention in its most essential one must understand a different search engine -arguably Google's inspiration -, namely Altavista. Instead of crawling through the entire web, searching for buzz words, Altavista used links -highlighted words in a text document which led the reader directly to a web-page -to generate search results. The procedure allowed the search engine to be incredibly fast, especially in comparison with its competitors. However, also Altavista shared the problem of not sorting the results in a useful way.
Page and Brin developed the link-based search further by comparing links of web pages to references in academic work (Vise & Malseed, 2006) . The more references lead to one particular academic work, the greater the importance of the work. The same should be true for websites. Quickly, both inventor entrepreneurs began to program a link rating system which gave more weight to web-pages that were highly mentioned by links. In other words, websites with high traffic appeared as top searches while lowtraffic websites appeared in a lower position. A radical new invention was born. Page and Brin embedded the algorithm into their first official search program "BackRub", an immediate success. In a couple of weeks, it was used by thousands of Stanford students on campus. Only a few months after their invention, Google financially on the condition of them receiving stocks in the case of a successful launch later during development (Vise & Malseed, 2006 ).
Development Phase
Once the planted seed of a radical new invention can flourish, it proceeds into its developmental phase.
According to Hughes' LTS approach, within the developmental phase, the invention develops a system structure and its first related components (Bijker, Hughes, Pinch, 2012 ). The new system is used by or is available to a larger group of consumers. It adapts to social economic and political characteristics of its environment. The inventor entrepreneur is still in charge of the system, yet the managing power is often distributed. Hughes suggests the inventor entrepreneur can be replaced or substituted by the management entrepreneur who has a further guiding position. Furthermore, during this phase, the system must encounter its first reverse salients. In many new technical systems, the most prominent first reverse salient is financial support. Up to this point, the system grows metaphorically in the dark. It is recognized by few, but not perceived as the LTS it is going to be. Hughes suggests, if the new system is offered to already existing Large Technical System's it is, similar to a radical new invention, rejected as an unfitting component. Finding investors who support the early system is therefore vital and of upmost importance.
After the radical new invention Backrub/ Google was founded, it did however not jump directly into the development phase. At that time, it was not even clear if their radical new invention would develop a system structure, which would add new components. New physical artifacts in the form of self-build computer systems were added to fulfill the demands of their ever more resource and energy-hungry program (Vise & Malseed, 2006) . This extension happened to such an extent that in mid-1997 Pages' dorm room was rebuilt into a server room. Yet, the inventor entrepreneur kept Google below its potential.
Available under its first domain "google.stanford.edu", the search engine soon enjoyed prominence far beyond campus borders. Search demands were too high to be handled by two PhD student with a few computers. However, Page and Brin were skeptic about providing their radical new invention the needed system structure to fulfill its demands. In mid-1999, Google was able to generate 500.000 search requests on an average day and started to compete with other search engines such as AltaVista and even Yahoo, regarding the size of their searchindex (Vise & Malseed, 2006) . The former project of two PhD students grew into a company with 40 employees. But Google did not stop there. Though web-search was the priority for Brin and Page, the two inventor entrepreneurs intended to extend their now system structure beyond initial invention. For example, in 2000 the Google image search was integrated into the regular Google search. This was the first time a search engine incorporated this.
However, guided by two inventor entrepreneurs with a background in engineering, the system arguably grew without a precise plan or business strategy. The system builders Page and Brin followed the first and foremost goal which was to optimize the system. This soon resulted in the company's encounter with its first reverse salient -finance. To recapitulate, the early success of Google can be boiled down to two aspects. Firstly, and unmistakably, Google delivered a better search service that its competitors. Secondly, Page and Brin strongly opposed conventional advertising. Unlike other websites, Google did not propagate flashy imagery and advertisement. On the one hand, this made the website incredibly fast, but on the other hand, undermined one of the most important financial pillars of web market at the time. The alternative, to charge people money for using their service, would not have worked either as users, even more than today, were extremely skeptical about paying for digital services. In other words, Google had no idea in which direction the system was supposed to go or how to make money in the first place. Google was stuck in the developmental phase.
The reverse salient was declared as critical problem when Google slowly ran out of its financial backup of 20 million dollar provided by early investors. As Hughes' LTS approach suggests in this phase,
the system needed to adapt to the market. (Bijker, Hughes, Pinch, 2012) Hence the reverse salient was approached in a twofold way. Firstly, the system guidance was extended by a third leading member, Eric Schmidt, whom can be considered as manager entrepreneur. Unlike Page and Brin, Schmidt had a background in management and was the former CEO of the software and service company "Novell, Inc.". Even though the main guiding force was in the hands of the two initial System Builders, Schmidt was supposed to introduce the first business plan to make the company sustainable. (Vise & Malseed, 2006) Secondly, to overcome the reverse salient of finance, Google introduced in 2001 a conservative invention called "AdWords", an advertising program associated with search. (Wiesend, 2015) The idea was simple. By associating key words with public sales, Google managed to link advertising to the user directly.
In doing so, Google held online auctions where advertisers could bet on specific words such as names of car brands or public products in general. Such words were sold in a price range from a few cents up to more than 15 US$ per click. If a user searched for a sold word, the advertising of a company which owned the word appeared in a small box next to the search results. Additionally, "AdWords" was subsidized by the so call "Cost-per-Click" concept. Advertisers were only charged if the user clicked on an advertiser's link. The more an advertisement was followed, the higher it also appeared in the search results. This way,
Google revolutionized and democratized the advertising market at the same time. Companies worldwide were able to display their products for a relatively small amount of money. Massive PR budgets which
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This invention came just in time. Already one year before, the so-called "Dot-com bubble", i.e.
speculative investments due to a tremendous overvaluation of internet companies due to, started to bust.
Many internet companies which did not find a financial pillar crashed. Yahoo, which was one of Google's largest competitors up to this point, lost not only much of its stock value but also many of its users, especially to Google. The technical system by Page, Brin and Schmidt, however, was barely affected by the financial disaster and even came out of the crisis better informed. Finally, Google was given the unique opportunity to establish market dominance, best depicted when Yahoo gave in completely and embedded
Google's search engine into their own web-portal in 2001. According to Hughes, the system had passed the developmental phase (Vise & Malseed, 2006 ).
Innovation Phase
Hughes argues, if the system overcomes its reverse salient, it approaches the innovation phase (Bijker, Hughes, Pinch, 2012) . Thus, the system is ready to enter the market and to prevail in competition against other LTSs. By entering the market, the complexity established up to this point is revealed. Both the competition, as well as the public, become aware of the massive network of components which developed within the two previous phases. The process of revelation takes mostly place when a technical system goes public. Thus, not only its complexity is revealed, but also its financial worth and turnover. At this point, the system builder strives to increase the size of the system and decrease the influence of factors which are not in control of the system. Further components are added relating manufacturing, sales and service facilities. Such new components can be part of the initial company, but also be entire new companies which are related to the system. Overall, the system attempts to create a dominating market position. The radical new invention from the beginning slowly acquires the shape of a Large Technical System. Hughes suggests that, in this phase the influence of the inventor-entrepreneur slowly decreases, while the influence of the manager-entrepreneur increases.
Google entered the stage of innovation on the 19th of August 2004, when the system builder affirmed the companies worth and turnover and thus revealed its complexity. The public became aware that Google not only created a completely new market in advertising but also that the company was already deeply rooted in it.
The step of going public was mainly initiated by Schmidt and against the will of Brin and Page (Vise & Malseed, 2006) . According to Schmidt, Google needed more investment capital, and going public would be the only possible solution. The two inventor entrepreneurs, however argued against Schmidt by claiming that going public would reveal the true trajectory of Google. Google's potential competition would find out how much money is behind combining search with advertising and would join the new market.
Furthermore, going public would imply that the company was in public hands. Hence, Page and Brin feared that short time growth-the immediate satisfaction of Google stock buyers -would become most essential, restricting the inventor-entrepreneurs from risky investments.
After a long debate, Google again took a rather unconventional turn. Again, not relying on external environments, in this case the Wall Street stock market, Google created something unique at the time:
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Momentum
Momentum suggests that the LTS becomes less dependent on its environment. (Mayntz & Hughes, 2005) The interconnection of components created the appearance of autonomy. In other words, the Large
Technical System acquired such a mass and velocity that inner dynamics seem to drive the course of development. The more components are involved into the system structure, the more momentum increases. Microsoft, famous for bringing the computer to nearly every household, planned to join the race of searchengines. Just as it did with the previous web search engine "Netscape", Microsoft tried to surpass Google by introducing a similar search engine, intending to outplay its competition with a larger market share. In a press conference in the fall of 2004, Microsoft released a statement that their own search engine had surpassed Google's search index by one billion websites, now enabling users to search the web within a search index of five billion websites. This step was extremely cost intensive for Microsoft. Web search was a business branch which previously did not gain massive attention and was not even financially beneficial without Google's "AdWords". Microsoft's idea however turned out to be more difficult than expected. A few days after Microsoft's official announcement, Google also disclosed a press release, stating their former search index doubled and encompassed now almost the entirety of the internet. Eight billion websites were now available to the user. Google's momentum which it established through its network of technical and no-technical components, programs, algorithms and server structures shattered its competition.
But momentum can also be perceived without focusing on Google's most profitable share in the internet market. According to Hughes, momentum is obtained when an LTS becomes less dependent on its environment by incorporating it into the system (Bijker, Hughes, Pinch, 2012) . Zooming out, Google did not only stick to its initial environment of web search but has grown in multiple directions which are
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Research Papers barely related to its core idea. In 2001/2002. Google introduced Google News, an attempt to centralize news stories from all over the world on one page. In 2001 Google set off Google Earth, a global attempt to photograph the entire world, followed by Google Maps in 2004. Yet, most illustrating for Google's expansion to different environments is "desktop search". "Desktop search" was a program which could be downloaded to a Microsoft computer and search the computer better than its initial operating system (Vise & Malseed, 2006) . A further embarrassment for Microsoft. Clearly, these are just three examples of web search unrelated components which would need further investigation by themselves, yet they demonstrate the enormous velocity Google gained during its evolution.
I argue, however, that especially the appearance of momentum has a different source despite the system's evolution and growth. Media has a major share in creating Google's image of being unstoppable.
Magazines and newspapers like the "The Wall Street Journal" or "Fortune", must reads in the American business world, published headlines such as "Why Google Scares Bill Gates" or "Living in the Google;
Welcome to Microsoft Nightmare" (Vise, Malseed, 2006, p.253) . Doubtless, Google became an LTS which was almost impossible to compete with, but such headlines stressed this notion even further.
Yet, it is important to stress, Google is aware of its momentum and even further, which impression momentum can have on the external environment. If much power is concentrated in one place, people tent to become suspicious about how such power is used. As I will demonstrate later this was not different for Google. Google attempted to oppose this notion by developing a highly valued system culture. The motto "Don't be evil", introduced in 2000/2001 was supposed to influence every inventor's ideas and to be of guidance to Google's business strategy (Schmidt, 2014) . Surely, this motto can be critiqued as Google's naïve and idealistic attempt of "making the world a better place", especially as it was still up to Page and Brin to decide what is "evil". Nonetheless, no other company did make their motto to such an important part of their business culture.
To recapitulate, within the phase of competition and consultation Google acquired momentum.
From an outsider's perspective, it seems as if Google's success was unstoppable. The system continuously grew without the restriction of any actor. Yet, is that true? In the following I suggest, even though Google gained the notion of momentum, it did not become technological deterministic. To understand that
Google's momentum is influenced by further factors, I rely on the concept of transfer.
Transfer
The second concept to which Hughes pays a lot of attention within the phase of competition and consultation is transfer (Bijker, Hughes, Pinch, 2012 (Mayntz & Hughes, 2005) Google's notion of transfer can be analyzed in two ways. Firstly, as Hughes intended in his original approach, when the company moves to a different environment in a geographical sense, it needs to adapt its system style. Secondly, if the company adds new components to the system, the system's technical style needs to be transferred onto such components as well. Yet, before evaluation how the concept of transfer can be assigned to Google, I need to clarify how I understand Google's technical style. In alignment with the LTS approach, I consider Google's second revolutionary invention "AdWords" as its manifestation of technical style. Since then, Google has been collecting data to match it with user related advertising.
During Google's competition and consultation phase, transfer in a geographical sense was a relatively minor problem. As is natural for an online platform, Google was able to operate on a global scale from the very beginning. The system did not have to alter its style to appeal to users from different cultural and geographical environments. The only minor system change was its translation to the respective countries' national languages (Vise & Malseed, 2006) . However, I do not consider that as an alternation of the system's style because the system was still able to run with and on its traditional components.
Furthermore, as the internet was unregulated by political actors to a wide extent, Google as large technical system did not have to fear any law violations. Some publisher's campaign to improve the copyright, for instance, was largely ignored and only gained little public and institutional attention. Everything within the reach of the possible was permitted.
However, focusing my analysis on the transfer of Google's technical style onto its components,
Google recognized quickly that this form of transfer was unexpectedly problematic. In the spring of 2004,
Google introduced "Gmail" a free e-mail service which was supposed to be the counter draft to the marketdominating e-mail services by Microsoft and Yahoo. With a data storage of one gigabyte -at the time a massive amount -Google wanted to provide its customers with the comfort of not having to delete any mail anymore. To make the component profitable, Google transferred the same technical style from its search engine to its new e-mail service. Thus, Google analyzed what their users were typing and in accordance provided relevant advertising, arguably all for the benefit of the user. However, this transfer did not only backfire. It immediately became a reverse salient, putting the entire component "Gmail" into question. Knowing that Google Was scanning, categorizing and collecting data for further analysis generated a public outcry. Suddenly, privacy issues became an important point of discussion. People began to ask how Google search and "Gmail" were connected and what data would be stored by it. Google generated sensible data for commercial purposes. Already that was seen controversial, but activists also began to worry, what could happen, if such data fell into the hands of third parties. (Auletta, 2010) The public discourse which was initiated due to this unsuccessful transfer went completely against their established system style. If Google wanted to maintain its momentum and scale of growth it needed to maintain its system style and hence rely on user data without any restrictions. Yet, if the users became unwilling to share their data, Google's system style could not be maintained, and if it did not adapt in a certain way, it would eventually cause Google to lose its momentum.
Noticeably, this interpretation of transfer and momentum guides the intention to a factor which massively influences the LTS yet finds not much attention in Hughes initial Large Technical System approach. Refocusing my research on this factor will bring further understanding about how momentum might be overcome -how the expansion of an LTS might be limited.
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Research Papers 5 LTS and the power of the user I will again turn to Google and its behavior as an LTS. Furthermore, I need to complete Hughes's initial Large Technical System approach by adding one guiding component besides the system builder. Especially by analyzing contemporary internet companies, the user as a social actor is particularly important. Taking a social constructivist stance, I argue that the user and more specifically the user's favor decide if a system can pass Hughes's described stages of development. The user, even more than the system builder, decides about the fate and future direction of the LTS. The user is not necessarily bound to an online service, especially if the service is free of cost in the first place. Thus, if the systems product or service does not appeal to the user, he will no longer support it. If the company does not provide the right service, users will immediately switch to a different one, reducing the company's income (Schulz, 2017) .
The additional concept of the user will finally help to understand why Google emerged as Hughes Google was able to pass the described phases of invention and development.
Nonetheless, this does not mean that Google was uninformed of its users and their power. Since the very beginning, Google Inc. and especially its system builders, put much work in the interaction with its users.
As an illustration, from 1998 to 2011 Page and Brin wrote a monthly newsletter named "Google Friends"
in which they informed users about their latest updates, future goals and had a section for user feedback.
Google never developed completely in the dark and strongly engaged in user discourse. Inspired by the academic tradition of Stanford University, Page and Brin regularly conducted experiments and tests to find out how their users behaved and how the search engine could be improvised accordingly (Vise & Malseed, 2006) . This way, for instance, in 1999 the System Builders discovered that their almost blank web page did not simplify its usage, but rather had a confusing effected. Some users starred at the page for more than five minutes. When asked later, they replied they were waiting for the website to fully load. This is the only reason why Google included a footer with contact details. Furthermore, it demonstrates perfectly the users' influence on the system.
The close user contact helped Google to imply a sense of transparency. In the eyes of the users, Google delivered a service which can be consumed, but nothing more. Combined with the strongly propagated system culture "Don't be evil", Google established an image of a user-friendly company whose primary intention was to improve the internet and later the world as such. (Schmidt, 2014) . It remains to be seen if the strategy of innovation will provide a solution for Google's critical problem and the user can be continuously be convinced.
Conclusion
I have demonstrated that Google can successfully be labeled a Large Technical System including the concepts of momentum and transfer. The Large Technical System approach can be helpful to understand the origin and growth of complex networks and systems. The general framework provides a useful tool to conceptualize the company's development and power even though not all elements of the Large Technical System approach are applicable to Google. The findings reveal that, the domination of power of the manager-entrepreneur in innovation phase or behavior of the mature LTS in the competition and consultation phase did not take place as suggested by Hughes.
The concepts of momentum and transfer can furthermore be applied to comprehend the system's expansion after attaining a large technical structure. Hughes' concepts vividly illustrate the dynamics of an LTS, but only the consideration of the user suggests that momentum is just a notion and that a system's decline can arise faster than expected. In essence, it is true that Google started out with a small revolutionary idea and became one of the most powerful companies in the world. Yet, it is not excluded from external influences and its momentum might not be eternal. The user, more than any other actor, decides the company's future.
Although according to the LTS criteria I established previously in my paper, the analysis was restricted by several factors. I had to restrict my analysis by not involving the concept of load factor (Joerges, 1996) . Although, this concept appears repeatedly throughout the competition and consultation period and is described as "the ratio of average system output to maximum output over a given period" (Joerges, 1996, p. 14) , there was no valid opportunity to involve the concept in the analysis of Google.
Even though my initial research question, namely what extent the theoretical concept of Large Technical Systems (LTS) can provide fruitful insights into the complexity and success of this internet platform, is answered positively and validates the LTS approach, it paves the way for a variety of subsequent questions. After the Large Technical System arrives at a dominant, mostly global position, Hughes' analysis stops. However, he states that LTSs are in constant change, so how do they maintain their dominant position? Furthermore, Hughes' describes a system evolution only within the frame of system growth.
Components are added to a system and are later attached to by other components -the network structure.
Yet, his approach does not explain what it means if one component is omitted. Moreover, it is not
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Has Google search the equal value such as newer branches of the company?
Following research into Google's development within the frame of LTS might be complemented by the research of Arne Kaijser (1995) . Noticeably, Kaijser turned away from a heavy focus on individual guiding actors and instead payed further attention to the links of an LTS's components. Within his theory of system coupling, his main interest is in linking LTS with further institutional actors. Kaijser seeks to find answers on what institutional and governing frameworks steer and how they influence an LTS, especially if the mature LTS spreads across country borders. In the case of Google, his approach is of special interest.
Within recent years, Google as a company gained an increasingly ambivalent name across different nations. Though Google`s services are massively used on a global scale, governments start to restrict
Google's power. To illustrate, in May 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union asserted the "right to be forgotten" as fundamental principal into EU law (Zuboff, 2019) . Enforceable 
